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Introduction
When  speaking of  maps  it  is  perfectly  reasonable  to  distinguish  between 
territory  and  space,  because  it  is  necessary  to  establish  some difference  between 
different ways of experiencing, remembering or thinking of places. Space, then, is a 
human production and therefore has historical  and cultural connotations. Hence the 
importance of maps, specially those which seek to be validated before a court and/or in 
the corridors of power. A map is a document and also a monument, which means that 
to its value as a record we have to add a diplomatic function. Perhaps those who think 
that maps serve to show us the way to places are right: we, however, unashamedly 
disagree with this so-called practical utilitarianism. In any event, this article will ignore 
that commonplace of Whig historiography which seeks to see maps as a sort of driving 
force  of  movement  or,  in  other  words,  to  explain  the  progress  of  voyages  or 
explorations by (or for) the existence of such representations of the seas or territories. 
We are backing a different strategy: to emphasize that maps are a highly original and 
efficient form of managing time. Thus, paradoxically, geographers would be experts at 
translating  spaces  into  time:  how long  a  journey  might  take  (roads),  the  traces  of 
administrators (estates or towns), the memory of conflicts (borders), the existence of 
sponsors (the names of things) or the signs of progress (ports or mines).
The  production  of  maps  is  not  as  uniform as  we  might  think,  and  differing 
practices record the different ways of understanding what a country was and, mainly, 
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space that they create may become. The certainties, lies and  folds that they contain 
and the corresponding management of time attain geopolitical rank or, in other words, 
serve a double purpose:  on one hand they fix dividing lines and on the other they 
benefit  their  owner. For that reason in the eighteenth century the new technologies 
applied to space production (scientific expeditions, geodesic cartography, the algebra 
of populations and resources and the engineering of borders and forts) put maps in a 
delicate situation.
Livingstone has already pointed out the profound geographical transformation 
imposed by physicotheology1, and one only has to read the introduction to El Orinoco 
ilustrado (1741) of the Jesuit José Gumilla to understand how much transition (spiritual) 
and management (material) there is in geographical description and in a map. But we 
are  referring  to  a  kind  of  representations  which  are  conceived  as  topographic 
repositories  ordered  within  both  the  territorial  and  jurisdictional  fields,  and  whose 
intention was to generate bonds of proximity and property, and thence of authority to 
participate in decision-making forums2. There are two things that happen to this type of 
representation in the middle of the eighteenth century. In the European context, the 
geographic paradigm promoted by Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville manages, on 
the one hand, to perfect the protocols of documentary criticism, especially concerning 
the location of enclaves and, on the other,  to emphasize the importance of purging 
‘formal’ or ‘modern’ maps of descriptive information3. Together with this effort to replace 
the rhetoric of description by that of formalization, there are also the requirements of 
imperial logic and, in particular, the desire to form a homogenous image of the totality 
of their American possessions4.
Thus, when in the eighteenth century it was decided to make a modern map of 
Southern America, there surfaced all the tensions associated with the task of creating a 
historical account from the remarkable diversity of sources available. The undertaking 
was all the more problematic because it came at a moment when there was an urgent 
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operations aimed at the production of new spaces.
Attempting the Big Picture
In 1775 Minister of State Grimaldi received the results of the work that had been 
ordered ten years before from the geographer Juan de la Cruz Cano y Olmedilla (1734-
1790): the engraving of a modern detailed map of Southern America. This map gave a 
uniform representation of a large part of everything that was known about an area of 
increasing  political  tension,  historically  mythical,  rich  in  natural  resources  and 
unexplored in many of its regions. Cruz Cano, trained in Paris in the studio of D'Anville, 
had to copy and oversee the engraving of plates of the map drawn by Francisco Millau 
y Maravall (1728-1805), a sailor who had taken part in the expeditions emanating from 
the Treaty of Limits (1750) on the boundaries between the American territories of the 
Spanish and Portuguese empires. It was an easy task, but in 1766 Cruz Cano took the 
decision not to copy it and to create a new map based on all those available5. 
Taking data coming from an extraordinary variety of  sources he produced a 
rough draft of great dimensions that could only be managed laid flat on the ground, and 
on which he verified longitudes “with respect to all the nations which have established 
their meridians”6. This work would bear fruitful results. In 1769, for example, appeared 
the  Spanish  edition  of  the  Viage  del  comandante  Byron  al  rededor  del  mundo, 
translated and annotated by  Casimiro  Gómez Ortega (1740-1818),  provided with a 
map by Cruz of the Magellan Strait, which consisted of a dialogue over two centuries 
between explorers, administrators and sailors, with sources ranging from the accounts 
of Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa (1555-1620), to the latest map of Milhau (1768). Such 
a  dialogue  was  possible  because  Cruz  worked  with  four  systems of  reference  for 
longitude, which included, as well as the Pico de Tenerife - still the most used- and the 
older one of Isla de Hierro, those of Paris and London, which were by then becoming 
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differences  and  the  war  of  names  maintained  with  the  English.  The  result  is  a 
toponymic  and  topographic  encyclopedia,  a  sort  of  museum  which  allowed  the 
hoarding of geographical space, and created a guide to the management of immense 
flows of colonial information. 
If we compare this map of the Strait of Magellan of 1769 with that of 1775 we 
immediately  notice  that  the information it  contains  is  as  important  as  that  which is 
eliminated. In the second, the longitudes refer in the first instance to the east of Teide, 
although  the  other  references  remain  and,  of  course,  the  toponymy  is  unified  to 
Spanish  or,  as  the  author  explains,  the  old  names  are  recovered.  Also  coastal 
measurements  and  defeats  (naval  information)  disappear,  announcing  what  was 
already known but  was not  yet  visible:  that  the coasts were going to be managed 
independently from the continental masses. As well as recovering the original names 
(which made it  easier  to  compare old documents)  the internal  political  borders are 
introduced -  a  decisive  information  to  learn  "where the Royal  Taxes are collected, 
where  there  are  Viceroyalties,  where  there  is  government  and  where  there  is  a 
Corregidor  (local  magistrate)7-,  as well  as  the highways and postal  stations.  Three 
objects (jurisdictions, communications and staging posts) that "... are not to be found in 
any geographer, and have only now been possible to obtain by dint of much time and 
good original information"8. Indeed, he had made a tremendous effort to flesh out the 
American skeleton with abundant colonial meat which, as a whole, included different 
forms  of  authority,  represented  political  and  cultural  relations,  defined  areas  of 
influence and recuperated documentary sources. Nevertheless, the map would soon 
become a source of argument, and not only for its errors or the persistence of some 
geographical myths9. 
Even before it left the presses, it already had its enemies. When Admiral of the 
Fleet Manuel Antonio de Flores appeared in 1769 in Juan Cruz’s house with his fellow 
naval  officer  Fernando  Senrra  to  supervise  the  development  of  the  map,  "they 
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included "10. It is not that the sailors hated the bureaucracy, nor that they distrusted 
these landbound  geographers.  They rejected the  disproportionate  character  of  that 
style of producing documents, based on technologies that were neither mathematical 
nor mechanical,  and whose usefulness they found hard to discern. They had been 
trained to produce and to read another type of maps, other forms of representing and 
codifying information. And their way of incorporating geographical information into the 
political universe was also different.
Cruz’s  attempt,  rather  than  representing  space,  unites  and  accumulates  it 
depending on its appearance in time or, better, history. Its purpose was not to show 
distances, but to fix the univocality of the colonial world, unifying visual codes so that 
the map could defend metropolitan sovereignty over a homogenous whole,  with no 
instability  nor  differences.  Cruz  was  not  aware  that  local  information  could  have 
strategic value and might produce certain political discrepancies. The Viceroy of Río de 
la  Plata,  D.  Pedro  de  Ceballos  (1715-1778)  had  the  map  before  him  while  he 
recommended his successor to use the roads from San Juan and the Diamante River 
to muster troops and to improve or raise the fortifications in Pergamino and Esquina de 
la Cruz Alta, Melinque and Punta del Sauce11. But if we project onto Cruz’s plan the 
troop movements and forts with which Ceballos intended to stabilize the province of 
Córdova and stimulate its colonization from the coast, (fig 1), and compare it with the 
plan of 1794 (fig 2) of the road between Valparaiso and Buenos Aires drawn up by 
Felipe Bauzá (1764-1834) and José Espinosa y Tello (1763-1815), we can see that 
Cruz’s  map  was  describing  the  relationship  of  the  people  to  their  surroundings 
(biopolitics) and not relationships of force on the borders (geopolitics).
In the map of  the sailors,  trained as hydrographers in the School  of  Higher 
Studies  of  the  Astronomical  observatory  of  Cadiz,  administrative  borders,  areas 
dominated by different  indigenous nations  and information on resources (the carob 
plantations of the Pampas, for example) all disappeared. There remained the rivers, 
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roads  and,  above  all,  broad  spaces  labeled  "unknown  land".  The  information  was 
suppressed in order better to calibrate the territory and to suggest the direction in which 
new spaces could be created. Thus, the blanks were functional because they avoided 
improvisations or the design of unreliable strategies. The unknown territory, as long as 
it did not change its status, counted only as a possibility and never as a political object.  
Hence in that interface of territory that we call a map, the silences served to represent 
areas  without  history  or,  in  other  words,  places  whose  resources  could  not  be 
mobilized and from which, as a consequence, no advantage could be obtained. 
The fact is that the versatility of the Cruz map as a strategic tool depended on 
what, at the end of century, was already a great defect. The military engineer Francisco 
Requena, admirer of the Aragonese Cruz, put his finger on it:  "he should print”,  he 
wrote in his report in 1802, “with lighter and less strong strokes everything that is put in 
the center of America purely for [geographical]  reference, and not well examined nor 
organized by celestial  observations, in order to differentiate, as all  Geographers do, 
what is well-known from what is doubtful"12. Requena seems to be suggesting that the 
manufacture of maps should take more care not to give equal weight to all the sources 
or methods of gathering information. The less certain the information, the weaker would 
be  the  outline,  showing  the  degree  of  reliability  of  the  sources,  formulating  the 
information "by layers", in such a way that each layer responded to different levels of 
requirements and that the disappearance of one did not affect the whole. The map of 
Cruz Cano, on the contrary, gave the same validity to all traditions (within the margins 
of rigor established by the historical criticism of the Enlightenment), and did not explain 
the values or interests by which the information could be prioritized. Consequently, it 
might be reasonably precise and practical, but by leaving open many possibilities, it 
gave rise to too much uncertainty: it neither stabilized an object (colonial space), nor 
eliminated a conflict (disputes with Portugal), nor did it set a trend; that is to say, it did  
not permit the identification of a line of progress in the management of the colonial 
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Depicting lands as achievement: maps as monuments.
The division of America into kingdoms favoured ways of approaching territory 
that created affinities within administrative spaces, but also led to clashes with other 
Viceroyalties. Nevertheless, the general cartographic representation of these spaces 
was not carried out at the same time, which meant that such representations were not 
a collective answer to the needs of the court in Madrid. Let us consider, for example,  
New Granada, whose first modern small-scale general map arrived in 1790, after being 
comissioned  by  the  Viceroy  Jose  Ezpeleta  (1740-1823).  At  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth century appeared the  Carta esférica que comprehende parte del Nuevo  
Reyno de Granada (1804-1805) of the engineers Joaquin Fidalgo and Carlos Cabrer. 
In  1808,  by  order  of  the  Viceroy  Antonio  Amat  y  Borbón,  the  lieutenant-colonel  of 
engineers Don Vicente Talledo and Rivera finished his famous  Mapa corográfico del  
Nuevo  Reyno  de  Granada,  drawn,  as  the  title  indicates,  according  to  "the  best 
astronomical observations, up to date news and trigonometrical operations".
In  New Spain  the demands for  a general  cartographic  representation  came 
earlier14. The first map of 1746 we owe to Jose Antonio Villaseñor y Sanchez (fl. 1733-
1756). Two decades later, it would be Father José de Alzate y Ramirez (1737-1799) 
who drew the Nuevo Mapa Geográfico de la América Septentrional Española, dividida  
en Obispados y Provincias (1767). Alzate also created in 1772 his other great map of 
New Spain,  the  Plano  Geográfico  de  la  mayor  parte  de  la  América  Septentrional  
Española,  a  correction  of  the  previous  one in  order  to  "bring  it  into  line  with  new 
astronomical  observations".  The  same  year,  Joaquin  Velázquez  Cárdenas  y  León 
(1732-1786) would draw his  Mapa manuscrito de toda la Nueva España (1772).  In 
1779,  Miguel  Constanzó  (fl.  1764-1790)  compiled  by  order  of  the  Viceroy  Bucareli 
(1717-1779) the map of the Internal Provinces and, some years later, Antonio Forcada 
8drew up the Mapa manuscrito de todo el reino de Nueva España, desde los 16º a los  
40º de latitud (1787)15. And, finally, in 1794 we already have that prepared by Carlos de 
Urrutia  (1750-1825),  Plano  Geográfico  de la  mayor  parte del  Virreynato  de Nueva  
España (1793), included in the Noticia Geográfica del Reyno de Nueva España (1794), 
a text of statistical and demographic character that the Viceroy and second Count of 
Revilla Gigedo (1740-1799) had asked him for16. 
In fact, as we see, the administrative reforms of the colonies undertaken by the 
Bourbons  implied  a  remarkable  increase  in  cartographic  activity.  When  in  1741 
topographic  accounts  were  made  of  the  129  jurisdictions  which  New  Spain 
encompassed, only 5 included maps in their replies17, a deficiency that Alzate attributed 
to the instability of the mayors, for "since it is so laid down by law, a mayor resides in 
the same territory just a short time and, therefore, he cannot have that topographic 
instruction which the priests have "18. And the fact is that, indeed, the interest of the 
different religious orders in ethnographic, linguistic or anthropological studies, as well 
as economic  reasons,  had  given  them a considerable  advantage in  designing  and 
establishing  a  network  of  schools,  hospitals  and other  social  instruments,  such as 
churches or craftsmen’s workshops. No wonder then that the priests, as Alzate calls 
them, together with the Creoles, tended to see space as an object of great plasticity, 
subject to commercial, meteorological or sanitary vicissitudes and which, therefore, had 
frequently to be reviewed. The 1767 map drawn by Alzate mentioned above is a classic 
example. Its decorative border is made up of small boxes showing the country as a 
cornucopia of vegetable and animal life, inhabited by people occupied in a diversity of 
work19.  The  territory  is  always  seen  in  relation  to  these  two  poles:  resources  and 
people. When the map is unfolded, what its small symbols show is always the relation 
between both, their absence or presence.
But this border would be omitted in the second version of the map, producing 
another type of cartographic blank, one that silenced the moral history, which had been 
so successfully developed by Jesuit or Franciscan literature (fig 3). The cancellation of 
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and  hence  the  dialogue  with  other  New  Spanish  geographers,  especially  with 
Costanzó,  Luis  Surville20 and the anonymous author of  the map of  the province of 
Sonora of 1770. So, for example, Alzate would record forts (for example, "Our Lady of 
the  Pilar,  is  the  prison  of  the  Adaes,  created  in  1717"),  mines  and  indigenous 
establishments. For his part Costanzó would also record  forts (existing or reformed) 
and detachments, in addition to urban nuclei, including missions, estates, royal mines, 
indigenous settlements, staging posts and stopping places, also including abandoned 
sites and derelict mines, signs which tell us not what there is, but what there was; in 
other words, that show us a territory under construction21. 
In the case of the Internal Provinces,  whose three most important provinces 
(New Biscay, New Mexico and Sonora) totalled 226,600 inhabitants, mostly dedicated 
to trading and mining22, they were the object of mapmaking which, in our opinion, is of 
particular  interest  to verify how, in  the midst  of  extraordinary tensions between the 
indigenous  populations  and  the  metropolis,  maps  contributed  to  the  redefinition  of 
strategies of territorial management. They were required in order to sanction or correct 
measures  affecting  the  consolidation  of  new  spaces23.  And  their  influence  was 
particularly clear in the policies of the line of forts. Captain of Engineers Nicholas de 
Lafora, who with the regimental draughtsman Second Lieutenant Jose Urrutia would 
accompany the Marquis  de Rubí in his commission to visit the forts on the northern 
frontier of the viceroyalty and to propose the reforms that he considered advisable24 , 
would  entitle  his  report  "Report  of  Captain  of  Engineers  Don  Nicolás  de  Lafora 
concerning the securing of the borders of New Biscay. Based on what he has seen of 
them, the reports of the most practical people and on the most correct maps of this 
country” (1766). And later he prepared the "Mapa de la frontera de Nueva España" 
(1771),  in  which he showed how forts should be redistributed:  the plan and report 
would  become the  essential  reference  for  the  decision  of  reform25.  The  symbol  of 
depopulation might mean the exhaustion of a resource or the victory of the insurgent 
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Indians26.  But at the same time, the discovery of new deposits or the foundation of 
other  colonies  confirmed  the  prospects  of  continuity  in  the  fight  against  the  trend 
towards depopulation, for Governor Riperdá himself foresaw that the province of Texas 
"will only have its name left"27. The maps were still descriptive, but they also sought to 
be prescriptive. And this in spite of the fact that their references could be extremely 
unstable and fragile. If settlements, particularly of miners, could be very short-lived28, 
the line of forts would have to face the threat of becoming isolated from each other29. 
The construction of the territory as achievement,  as the gradual conquest of 
stability, not only established local actors as important political agents as in the case of 
the earliest chorographic production30, but basically, unlike the latter, redeveloped the 
concept of territory as a fundamentally technological and economic enterprise towards 
which all social and natural actors are drawn. This participation took different forms, 
from consultation31, to individual or collective economic contribution32 or the creation of 
establishments and infrastructures33. The identity of places is not defined exclusively by 
their plants or animals, but by their mines and water supply34. Maps were showing that 
only the proper use of suitable technologies could replace the immense emptinesses 
depicted in the abandoned provinces with prospects of new colonies. 
The empire as a strategy of access: facing deterritorialization
The multifarious corrections that the Cruz Cano map underwent, beginning with 
the erasure of the demarcation line of the Spanish-Portuguese border, form part of the 
obsession  of  the  metropolitan  authorities  with  having  fixed,  almost  immutable, 
cartography. This does not mean that it  was unnecessary to make modifications to 
them, only that whatever went into them could no longer be moved. For this reason, 
time and caution are required when filling in a map. Thus, in Bauzá’s map of Patagonia 
(1798) (fig 4)35 the interruptions of the coastline were evidence of a lack of  certain 
knowledge  and,  in  the  same  way,  all  the  information  about  the  area  considered 
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doubtful  or  inadmissible  also  disappears,  e.g.  the  communication  routes  that  Cruz 
Cano drew in Tierra del Fuego. We have before us, then, a map very different from 
those mentioned before. In contrast to the profound historicism and overload of data on 
the “intendencia” or regional maps, naval hydrographers created a style of mapmaking, 
following guidelines from the metropolis, which aimed for a radical level of stability. This 
stability was, of course, restricted almost exclusively to the principal aim of these maps, 
the outline of the coast.
We are talking here about a drift which affected all imperial powers in the same 
way, and which needs to be explained. There is nothing obvious about a process that 
had turned the memory of places, all that information compiled by Cruz Cano from the 
most varied documentary sources, into irrelevant information: extraneous curiosities, 
trivialities  for  scholars.  Harley interprets  this  displacement,  prompted by a scientific 
theory, as a landmark in the process of dehumanization of the landscape, concealed 
beneath the inability of hydrographic engineers to include the descriptions of peculiar 
and local features36. We respect this approach, but we are sure that there is something 
more to be said about the proliferation of empty space, the desire for silence imposed 
by  imperial  management.  Indeed,  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  Spanish 
cartographic  production was extraordinarily  developed,  at  the same time as means 
were  created  to  reunite  dispersed  historical  material  referring  principally  to  the 
colonies37.  Not  all  came into  public  view,  but  many were  published  or  copied  and 
interchanged at the request of other European countries. Suddenly maps acquired an 
enormous diplomatic value. 
What  was  at  stake  were  the  limits  of  empire,  and  maps  were  no  longer 
exclusively  scientific,  becoming documents in  an international  dialogue  of  markedly 
legal  character.  The very idea of  an imperial  limit  is  still  strange.  The old empires’ 
strategies for structuring territory show to what extent the construction of imperial limits, 
in contrast with its empty spaces, has not been a constant38. The preoccupation with 
accurately drawing the coastal perimeter was the consequence of a deep conceptual 
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transformation  of  ocean  space  that  had  been  developing  since  the  end  of  the 
seventeenth century. If  the increase in marine traffic raised the problem of whether 
ocean space should be of a public nature, a common39; the political and legal analysis 
of  the  insular  condition  opened  by  Great  Britain  encouraged  new  geostrategic 
balances40. The proposal to establish contact with the enemy on the basis of regional 
economic criteria and not the balance of European powers lent political robustness to 
the trading enclaves, even giving preference to the islands, subject to limits of supply 
(Gillis,  2003).  And  Great  Britain  had  sufficient  military  arguments  to  guarantee 
commercial privileges for its colonies. 
What  comes  later  is  easy  to  explain  because  the  development  of  naval 
technology reduced distances and increased contacts between the different colonies 
and  with  the metropolis.  Space  was  contracted,  deterritorialized,  and  in  few years 
European colonial  policies  changed dramatically.  The main strategic  option was no 
longer the search for a point in the coast from which to reach interior41.  Now the goal 
was on the coast itself, the main area of claims for jurisdictional rights, even when there 
were no claims of ownership42. But the spectacular development of trade gave constant 
cause  for  tension  which,  by  opening  bitter  disputes  on  the  legitimacy  of  certain 
commercial privileges, ended in the revision of criteria for the acceptance of claims of 
territorial possession.
At the end of the century, the Nootka crisis brought Spain and Great Britain to 
the brink of war43 making it clear that the intricate jurisdictional network that maintained 
such a fragile equilibrium was sustainable only so long as the principle of property was 
not put into question.  Great Britain,  who until  then had been guided by the classic 
criterion of discovery and symbolic possession, upheld occupation as a basic principle 
to justify these rights44. The signature of the El Escorial agreement (1792), that would 
end such tensions, as well as the difficulties of the later commission of limits to make 
the treaty effective, would show that the battle for the islands dealt a death blow to 
traditional colonial balances. A large part of the Spanish possessions in America had 
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not been ratified in any treaty, and in Spain there was suspicion of the danger that the 
English would "populate and fortify the immense coasts and islands of our America 
from the River Plate, going round Cape Horn to Valdivia and Chiloé;  nor are there 
sufficient forces nor strength to prevent it  nor yet any means of knowing the places 
where they are until it is too late to cast them out"45. It is no wonder then that José 
Francisco Bodega y Quadra (1743-1794), to avoid the threat of disintegration posed by 
the English demand for the return of their possessions at Nootka, insisted that George 
Vancouver  (1757-1798)  recognize that  occupation did  not  imply property46,  a tailor-
made formula to counter the new British arguments for defining unconquered lands. In 
any case, the Spanish crown had to recognize that it needed to reformulate its policy of 
production of coastal space.
The treaty contemplated a moratorium on the creation of new settlements on 
the islands and coasts of southern America, but, according to a secret article, the pact 
would only be valid as long as no power settled in that area47. This situation forced the 
Spanish crown to keep constant watch, which made the possession of the coast and 
adjacent  islands in some way a geostrategic disadvantage.  Bodega y Quadra must 
have  trembled  at  the  possibility  that  a  large  part  of  what  had  been  taken  for  a 
continental mass might turn out to be an archipelago48: hence his hurry, and that of 
Vancouver, each for opposite reasons, to examine the coast "at whatever risk" "from 47 
degrees southwards with such precision that not one river or bay be overlooked as far 
as 41 degrees"49. This is also the reasoning behind the decision to leave settlements 
like  San Blas,  with  a terrible  climate  and insufficient  depth  for  large frigates,  or  to 
occupy enclaves strategic for trade, like Nootka, and to make the already existing ones 
to the north of California profitable. All  these suggestions were directed towards the 
construction of a coastline independent from the territories of the interior. A line which, 
after being recognized and being translated into an international language (that is to 
say, mathematical), would permit the localization of a handful of enclaves suitable for 
marine trade. This strategy had the advantage that it assumed the commodification of 
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the  coastal  strip,  favoured  by  the  new  navigational  facilities,  but  it  would  restrict 
occupation to the objectively occupiable enclaves. In addition, the coasts were marked 
as the limits of new space. In other words, their  "inland", the densely-filled area on the 
map in relation with which the coastal strip established references and, so to speak, 
communicates, was located in the oceanic space. 
Although  the  question  of  property,  jurisdiction  and  sovereignty  would  be  a 
lasting problem, maps achieved diplomatic status because, as they accumulated the 
different  defeats on the same plan,  new discoveries and successive reconnaisance 
were introduced directly and fully into international legislation50. At the same time, the 
territorial vacuum of the inland space turned the coasts into a legal watershed. And as 
it  did  so,  the  hydrographic  charts  identified  as  the  only  valid  interlocutors  in  the 
international panorama their indirect author, the Spanish Crown, and those powers in a 
position to construct a territory on the ocean. 
The  enclaves,  in  short,  gained  value  insofar  as  they  came to  form part  of 
transoceanic  trade,  which  meant  that  the  policies  of  space  production  had  to  be 
projected onto the surface of the seas. In practice the oceans then ceased to belong to 
the public domain, and those “silences” that the hydrographers had depicted inlands of 
the  continental  masses  were  offset  by  these  claims  offshore. Thus,  the 
"deterritorialization"  implied  by  the  purge  of  the  Cruz  map  ran  parallel  to  this 
“reterritorialization”  of  the Empire of  the seas,  which the hydrographers depicted in 
order to be able to take part in the new struggles of geopolitics. 
Conclusion
The erudite commander Alexander Malaspina once defined the British empire 
as an amphibious body with a trading head and military body 51. It is also possible to 
invent an ad hoc chimera for the Spanish empire, another monster whose body was 
half  inland  and  half  a  shoreline  empire. Cartography,  indeed,  echoed  this  duality, 
15
because  what  was  valid  at  the  level  of  biopolitics  (the  cross  between  geographic 
features and the tracks of human activity), was inadmissible on the scale of geopolitics 
(the cross between two types of document, scientific and diplomatic).. 
However,  strategic  considerations  are not  sufficient  to  justify  the differences 
between the internal and external representations of the dominions of the empire. We 
also need to consider other arguments of an epistemic nature. The internal argument 
emphasized the location of resources and populations, and it was restricted to showing 
the existence of certain territorial bonds that, besides creating a hierarchy of places, 
also worked as lines of force that hinted at future mobilizations. The territory at that 
time was constructed like an organization in a permanent process of growth, which 
implied the rejection of earlier cartographic traditions. On the other hand, the oceanic 
representation of the empire rejected any idea of change, whatever the situation in the 
continental interiors, trying to turn the coasts into an ontologically stable object which 
would in consequence be manageable by a lasting international treaty.
Within this context the failure of Cruz Cano’s map indicated the end of a world 
whose actors had lost political relevance, and which, together with the archaeological, 
anthropological or ethnographic knowledge to which they were intimately bound, had to 
migrate from the world of wonders and curiosities to that of treasures and thesauruses. 
And just as maps became technical documents, objects too underwent a process of 
thesaurisation (according to the new conventions produced by the scientists) before 
being put away into the reduced space of the museums52. So, as their display cabinets 
filled,  the  maps  emptied. Cartographic  voids,  nevertheless,  behaved  differently 
according to whether they referred to the inland or the shoreland empire. The “silences” 
that came from the interior preached the end of exceptionality and the beginning of the 
fact that the whole territory could be treated with the same yardstick: that is, by means 
of  biopolitical  tools  (demographic  tables,  balances  of  payments,  inventories  of 
resources, medical geographies,  botanical classifications) and management projects 
consistent  with  territorial  evolution. On  the  contrary,  their  use  in  coastal  maps 
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contributed  to  the  illusion  that  the  hydrographic  solution  was  universal  and, 
consequently,  being  free  of  political  connotations,  could  be  the  basis  for  a  global 
solution to geopolitical conflicts. Using the voids in such a different way, the Spanish 
crown  disconnected  two worlds,  which  allowed  it  to  be  an  important  actor  on two 
stages at once, competing with the British in the maritime theater without, on the other 
hand, jeopardizing its own colonial policies.
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